Research
Epistemology
One belief can justify another, but only if it is itself justified. Since at least Aristotle, foundationalists have held that the resulting regress of justification must terminate in foundational beliefs whose justification is immediate, and does not derive from other beliefs or background evidence. But what is the source of this immediate justification? If it comes from experience, then which ones justify and what is it that enables them to do so? Such questions about the foundations of justification remain some of the most mysterious and fascinating in epistemology.
The first half of my epistemological research project attempts to answer such questions, often drawing from early modern philosopher Thomas Reid. (See McAllister 2016b for my interpretation of Reid.) Simply put, immediate justification derives from how things appear—from “seemings.” I explicate the nature of seemings and show why they, and only they, are foundational sources of justification. A crucial revelation is that the fundamental orientation of rationality is not suspicion or incredulity but trust that the world is as it seems to be. As Reid says, “I am persuaded, that the unjust live by faith as well as the just." I am currently drafting a book defending this view (McAllister forthcoming a), and have already defended elements of it in McAllister 2018a, 2019c, 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming c, and Gage and McAllister 2020.
The second half of my project applies these insights to epistemological issues more generally, particularly in philosophy of religion. I have papers considering the role of seemings in faith, belief in God and Christianity, religious and moral disagreement, and the problem of evil (see McAllister 2018b, 2019b, 2020, 2021b, 2022b, Dougherty and McAllister 2019, and Gage and McAllister 2020).
I also have interests in epistemology and philosophy of religion/philosophical theology more generally (e.g., McAllister 2019a, 2022a, 2016a) and hope to expand more into these areas in the coming years.
Experimental Philosophy
I am currently a Project Collaborator on the John Templeton funded project, "Launching Experimental Philosophy of Religion" The purpose of the project is to kickstart a new sub-discipline in philosophy which uses the tools of the psychological sciences to probe arguments in philosophy of religion.
We are funding projects in many different areas, but the team at Hillsdale College is focused on the problem of evil. Thus far, we have examined whether the folk share the central intuitions underlying Rowe's evidential problem of evil and Draper's probabilistic problem of evil. In short, they don't. To see a summary of our findings on Rowe, and why we think they pose a significant challenge to the success of Rowe's argument, see McAllister, Church, Rezkalla, and Nguyen forthcoming. We are currently drafting a paper on Draper's argument. Follow up experiments should be conducted in the following years.
One belief can justify another, but only if it is itself justified. Since at least Aristotle, foundationalists have held that the resulting regress of justification must terminate in foundational beliefs whose justification is immediate, and does not derive from other beliefs or background evidence. But what is the source of this immediate justification? If it comes from experience, then which ones justify and what is it that enables them to do so? Such questions about the foundations of justification remain some of the most mysterious and fascinating in epistemology.
The first half of my epistemological research project attempts to answer such questions, often drawing from early modern philosopher Thomas Reid. (See McAllister 2016b for my interpretation of Reid.) Simply put, immediate justification derives from how things appear—from “seemings.” I explicate the nature of seemings and show why they, and only they, are foundational sources of justification. A crucial revelation is that the fundamental orientation of rationality is not suspicion or incredulity but trust that the world is as it seems to be. As Reid says, “I am persuaded, that the unjust live by faith as well as the just." I am currently drafting a book defending this view (McAllister forthcoming a), and have already defended elements of it in McAllister 2018a, 2019c, 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming c, and Gage and McAllister 2020.
The second half of my project applies these insights to epistemological issues more generally, particularly in philosophy of religion. I have papers considering the role of seemings in faith, belief in God and Christianity, religious and moral disagreement, and the problem of evil (see McAllister 2018b, 2019b, 2020, 2021b, 2022b, Dougherty and McAllister 2019, and Gage and McAllister 2020).
I also have interests in epistemology and philosophy of religion/philosophical theology more generally (e.g., McAllister 2019a, 2022a, 2016a) and hope to expand more into these areas in the coming years.
Experimental Philosophy
I am currently a Project Collaborator on the John Templeton funded project, "Launching Experimental Philosophy of Religion" The purpose of the project is to kickstart a new sub-discipline in philosophy which uses the tools of the psychological sciences to probe arguments in philosophy of religion.
We are funding projects in many different areas, but the team at Hillsdale College is focused on the problem of evil. Thus far, we have examined whether the folk share the central intuitions underlying Rowe's evidential problem of evil and Draper's probabilistic problem of evil. In short, they don't. To see a summary of our findings on Rowe, and why we think they pose a significant challenge to the success of Rowe's argument, see McAllister, Church, Rezkalla, and Nguyen forthcoming. We are currently drafting a paper on Draper's argument. Follow up experiments should be conducted in the following years.
Books
Seemings and the Foundations of Justification: A Defense of Phenomenal Conservatism (forthcoming a), Routledge |
Papers
(Please cite from published versions)
Empirical Challenges to the Evidential Problem of Evil (forthcoming b), Oxford Studies in Experimental PhilosophyThe problem of evil is broadly considered to be one ofthe greatest intellectual threats to traditional brands of theism. And William Rowe’s 1979 formulation of the problem in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” is the most cited formulation in the contemporary philosophical literature. In this paper, we explore how the tools and resources of experimental philosophy might be brought to bear on Rowe’s seminal formulation, arguing that our empirical findings raise significant questions regarding the ultimate success of Rowe’s argument. Such a result would be quite notable within philosophy of religion, since this is considered one of the most formidable arguments against theism. However, further testing is needed before any firm conclusions can be drawn.
Seemings and Truth (forthcoming c), Seemings: New Angles, New Arguments (eds. K. McCain and S. Stapleford), RoutledgeA belief is epistemically justified only if it bears an adequate connection to truth. Arguably, the truth-connection poses a problem for phenomenal conservatism, which grants some degree of prima facie justification to whatever seems true. I first consider the matter from an externalist perspective, showing how an effective connection to truth can be secured by phenomenal conservatism if needed. However, I suggest that it is not needed as justification guarantees only an intentional connection to truth. I then consider from an internal perspective whether seemings provide this sort of intentional connection. Revising the case of Norman the Clairvoyant, I explain why some think they do not. I argue in response that seemings elegantly account for an intentional truth-connection while avoiding common skeptical traps. All told, the truth-connection proves a merit of phenomenal conservatism, not a liability.
Rescuing a Traditional Argument for Internalism (2023), Synthese.Early moderns such as Locke and Descartes thought we could guarantee the justification of our beliefs, even in worlds most hostile to their truth, if only we form those beliefs with sufficient care. That is, they thought it possible for us to be impeccable with respect to justification. This principle has traditionally been used to argue for internalism. By placing all of the normatively relevant conditions in our minds, we ensure reflective access to what those norms require of us and so sustain the possibility of impeccability (unlike externalism). However, recent challenges to transparency leave this reasoning vulnerable. In response, I show how impeccability can be sustained without requiring transparency. The account only works if we define internal states as those directly accessible to our rational belief forming systems. I argue that this sort of causal internalism, while somewhat revisionary, preserves traditional motivations for internalism while avoiding problems faced by other varieties. The result is a renewed argument for internalism that simultaneously moves us away from access internalism and towards a species of mentalism.
Justification Without Excuses: A Defense of Classical Deontologism (2022a), American Philosophical Quarterly.Arguably, the original conception of epistemic justification comes from Descartes and Locke, who thought of justification deontologically. What’s more, their deontological conception was especially strict: there are no excuses for unjustified beliefs. Being the original, we ought to accept this conception of justification unless it proves untenable. Nowadays, however, most have abandoned classical deontologism as precisely that—untenable. It stands accused of requiring doxastic voluntarism and normative transparency. My goal is to rescue classical deontologism from these accusations. I show how, given a specific form of internalism coupled with a plausible theory of epistemic blame, we can be blameworthy for all of our (non-exempt) unjustified beliefs without transparency or voluntarism. The result is that the classical deontological conception of justification should regain its privileged status.
The Partiality of Faith (2022b), Australasian Philosophical ReviewKatherine Dormandy argues that there is no partiality in faith. Partiality biases and leads to noetic entrenchment. In response, I contend there is an important sense in which virtuous faith is partial towards its object. Namely, it disposes one to perceive the object as more trustworthy and to rely on this "partialist" evidence in forming beliefs, even when the "impartialist" evidence (the evidence available to everyone) points in the other direction. There are, after all, situations in which impartialist evidence is apt to mislead or to fail to bring one to the truth. In such cases, faith attunes one to the subject’s true motivations and intentions. Here the partiality of faith constitutes a kind of social acuity or expertise, not a bias. Indeed, to lack faith in such situations—and to give impartialist evidence equal weight with the partial—might constitute a kind of bias against the subject, casting his or her actions in an overly negative light.
From One Conservative to Another: A Critique of Epistemic Conservatism (2021a) Southwest Philosophical ReviewEpistemic conservatism maintains that some beliefs are immediately justified simply because they are believed. The intuitive implausibility of this claim sets the burden of proof against it. Some epistemic conservatives have sought to lessen this burden by limiting its scope, but I show that they cannot remove it entirely. The only hope for epistemic conservativism is to appeal to its theoretical fruit. However, such a defense is undercut by the introduction of phenomenal conservatism, which accomplishes the same work from a more intuitive starting point. Thus, if one opts for conservatism, better to choose the phenomenal kind.
Understanding Moral Disagreement: A Christian Perspectivalist Approach (2021b), ReligionsDeep moral disagreements exist between Christians and non-Christians. I argue that Christians should resist the temptation to pin all such disagreements on the irrationality of their disputants. To this end, I develop an epistemological framework on which both parties can be rational—the key being that their beliefs are formed from different perspectives and, hence, on the basis of different sets of evidence. I then alleviate concerns that such moral perspectivalism leads to relativism or skepticism, or that it prohibits rational discourse. I end by exploring new avenues for resolving deep moral disagreements opened up by the perspectivalist approach.
The Perspectival Problem of Evil (2020), Faith and PhilosophyWhether evil provides evidence against the existence of God, and to what degree, depends on how things seem the subject—i.e. on one’s perspective. I explain three ways in which adopting an atheistic perspective can increase support for atheism via considerations of evil. The first is by intensifying the common sense problem of evil by making evil seem gratuitous or intrinsically wrong to allow. The second is by diminishing the apparent fit between theism and our observations of evil. The third is by lowering the initial plausibility of theism. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil” and argue that skeptical theism does not fully address it.
The Phenomenal Conservative Approach to Religious Epistemology (with Logan Gage) (2020), in John DePoe and Tyler McNabb (eds.) Debating Religious Epistemology: An Introduction to Five Views on the Knowledge of God (Bloomsbury)
Conceptualism and Concept Acquisition (2019a), Theoria
Many think that the perceptual theory known as “conceptualism” cannot honor a common and intuitive constraint on concept acquisition—that we gain the initial power to deploy primitive concepts through experience. Their argument is: if experience involves the deployment of concepts, then one must possess the power to deploy those concepts prior to experience. I argue that the plausibility of this argument rests on a subtle equivocation. It’s true that conceptualism requires a particular kind of power to deploy concepts prior to experience, but not the sort referenced in the intuitive constraint mentioned above. I end by proposing how the conceptualist might satisfy this constraint. I conclude that conceptualism is better situated to account for primitive concept acquisition than typically thought.
Evidence is Required for Religious Beliefs (2019b), in Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Wiley-Blackwell)
Restoring Common Sense: Common Sense Epistemology and the Restoration Tradition (2019c), in Caleb Clanton (ed.) Restoration and Philosophy: New Philosophical Engagements with the Stone-Campbell Tradition (University of Tennessee Press)Alexander Campbell once declared “a solemn league and covenant” between philosophy and common sense. Campbell’s pronouncement is representative of a broader trend in the Restorationist movement to look favorably on the common sense response to skepticism—a response originating in the work of Scottish philosopher and former minister Thomas Reid. I recount the tumultuous history between philosophy and common sense followed by the efforts of Campbell and Reid to reunite them. I finish by defending the common sense epistemic principles underlying Campbell and Reid’s response as, in the main, correct.
Reforming Reformed Epistemology: A New Take on the Sensus Divinitatis (with Trent Dougherty) (2019), Religious StudiesAlvin Plantinga theorizes the existence of a sensus divinitatis—a special cognitive faulty or mechanism dedicated to the production and non-inferential justification of theistic belief. Following Chris Tucker, we offer an evidentialist-friendly model of the sensus divinitatis whereon it produces theistic seemings that non-inferentially justify theistic belief. We suggest that the sensus divinitatis produces these seemings by tacitly grasping probabilistic support relations between the content of ordinary experiences and propositions about God. Our model boasts numerous advantages such as eliminating the need for a sui generis religious faculty, harmonizing the sensus divinitatis with prominent theories in the cognitive science of religion, and providing a superior account of natural revelation.
Seemings as Sui Generis (2018a), SyntheseThe epistemic value of seemings is increasingly debated. Such debates are hindered, however, by a lack of consensus about the nature of seemings. There are four prominent conceptions in the literature, and the plausibility of principles such as phenomenal conservatism, which assign a prominent epistemic role to seemings, varies greatly from one conception to another. It is therefore crucial that we identify the correct conception of seemings. I argue that seemings are best understood as sui generis mental states with propositional content and a distinct phenomenal character. Rival conceptions are shown to succumb to numerous difficulties.
The Perspective of Faith: Its Nature and Epistemic Implications (2018b), American Catholic Philosophical QuarterlyA number of philosophers, going back at least to Kierkegaard, argue that to have faith in something is, in part, to have a passion for that thing—to possess a lasting, formative disposition to feel certain positive patterns of emotion towards the object of faith. I propose that (at least some of) the intellectual dimensions of faith can be modeled in much the same way. Having faith in person involves taking a certain perspective towards the object of faith—in possessing a lasting, formative disposition for things to seem as though the object of faith is worthy of one’s trust. After developing the view, I briefly discuss its epistemic implications. I suggest that, by systematically reorienting how one experiences the world, faith can actually change one’s total body of evidence (or perhaps even how one weighs that evidence), thereby altering what one is justified in believing about the object of faith.
Divine Command Theory and Moral Supervenience (2016a), Philosophia ChristiMark Murphy argues that the property identity version of divine command theory, coupled with the doctrine that God has freedom in commanding, violates the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. In other words, they permit two situations exactly alike in non-moral facts to differ in moral facts. I give three arguments to show that a divine command theorist of this sort can consistently affirm moral supervenience. Each argument contends that there are always non-moral differences between worlds with different divine commands. If there are such non-moral differences, then there’s no conflict between divine command theory and moral supervenience.
Re-evaluating Reid's Response to Skepticism (2016b), Journal of Scottish PhilosophyI argue that some of the most prominent interpretations of Reid’s response to skepticism marginalize a crucial aspect of his thought: namely, that our common sense beliefs meet whatever normative standards of rationality the skeptic might fairly demand of them. This should to be seen as supplementary to reliabilist or proper functionalist interpretations of Reid. My point is that half the story isn’t being adequately emphasized. I also show how Reid defends the rationality of believing first principles by appealing to their naturalness and irresistibility. The resulting interpretation provides a more satisfying and formidable response to the skeptic than those currently on offer.
Adequate and Inadequate Ideas in Spinoza (2014), History of Philosophy Quarterly 31(2): 119-136.Adequate and inadequate ideas play a central role in Spinoza’s system. A number of recent commentators have suggested that the internality or externality of an idea’s immediate cause is a necessary and sufficient condition of the idea’s adequacy or inadequacy, respectively. I show that this thesis is subject to counterexample and briefly explore the significance of this critique for recent interpretations. I offer an alternative interpretation on which adequate and inadequate ideas are characterized by the manner in which they grasp their objects. Adequate ideas conceive of their objects as following from God. Inadequate ideas conceive of their objects as affecting the body at a time and place.
|
